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Beyond Good and Evil 2 ist der Nachfolger des Kult-Klassikers, ein Prequel, das die Spieler in eine tiefgreifende, multikulturelle Welt befördert, während es den. The School for Good and Evil, Band 1: Es kann nur eine geben | Chainani, Soman, Bruno, Iacopo, Rothfuss, Ilse | ISBN: | Kostenloser Versand. Achetez et téléchargez ebook The School for Good and Evil 1: Es kann nur eine geben (The School for Good & Evil) (German Edition): Boutique Kindle - Enfants.
If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them.
But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?
Maas, Throne of Glass. One of the dogs is mean and evil. The other dog is good. The mean dog fights the good dog all the time.
When asked which dog wins, he reflected for a moment and replied, The one I feed the most. What if evil is something dreamed up by man, and there is nothing to struggle against except out own limitations?
The constant battle between our will, our desires, and our choices? Are you a decent girl with the potential to someday become an evil monster, or are you an evil monster that thinks it's a decent girl?
The lies we tell other people are nothing to the lies we tell ourselves. When a man cannot choose he ceases to be a man. Naturally, it may be used by evil men for evil purposes, but there are more good men than evil, and while the latter cannot be persuaded to the path of righteousness by propaganda, they can certainly be corrected by good men with rifles.
You're wrong, of course. There are, always and only, the bad people, but some of them are on opposite sides.
This is why right, temporarily defeated, is stronger than evil triumphant. All our lives the fight goes on between them, and one of them must conquer.
But in our own hands lies the power to choose — what we want most to be we are. It is never OK to make that accusation, as only God knows the heart.
They have embraced racism, bigotry, xenophobia and sexism and called it Christian values. They need to remember what Jesus embraced: character, love, and the outcasts of society.
He not only broke the religious and society rules by speaking to her, He shocked all with His love and He touched her heart by reaching out to her.
And since this is Christmas, remember the complete humility of Jesus very beginnings. He was born in nothing more than a barn, and He rode into Jerusalem not on a beautiful noble steed with gold plated saddle, but a simple donkey.
We both care based on our Christian values, we just reach a different conclusion as to what will help the poor. This is not you being evil as a conservative and me being good as a liberal or vice versa — this is a difference of political views.
We can and should hold mutual respect as believers on this standpoint, even as we disagree on policy and vote differently — remembering we have a mutual goal and value.
However, if you belittle the poor, if you scapegoat minorities who are poor, if you insult them, if you are hardhearted and without compassion…we now stand on opposite ends of scripture and you have just embraced an ideology that calls what Jesus Christ said is evil, good.
Sometimes what is passed off as good or holy on the outside is not. Likewise, we have also seen good things and good works called bad.
I have seen liberals mocked relentlessly for pushing an agenda of love and compassion. Efforts to help the poor are said to be giving handouts to drug addicts.
A Christian President who has had no scandals while in office, no investigations for corruption, who has upheld the office with decency and a high moral grounding accused of being a Muslim terrorist and disrespected in every way.
By all the means you can. In all the ways you can. In all the places you can. At all the times you can. To all the people you can.
Divorce in many conservative Christian circles is still a very dirty word, yet they embraced and excused a man with three divorces and multiple adulterous affairs, and mocked a candidate who had stood through the trial of extra-marital affairs and saved her marriage.
That is, for the internalist, there is a conceptual connection between believing that an action is wrong and having a con-attitude toward the action.
The internalist believes that one may be able to knowingly do what is wrong because, all things considered, she cares more about something that is incompatible with refraining from wrongdoing, provided she is at least somewhat inclined to refrain from doing what she knows to be wrong.
Since psychopaths seem to be completely indifferent to whether their actions are right or wrong, motivational internalists believe that they do not truly believe, or understand, that what they do is morally wrong.
At most, they might believe that their harmful actions break societal conventions. But it may be one thing to believe that one has broken a societal convention and quite another to believe that one has broken a moral rule.
Philosophers who reject the internalist thesis, i. According to motivational externalists, moral knowledge only requires an intellectual capacity to identify right and wrong, and not the ability to care about morality.
Since psychopaths are not intellectually deficient, motivational externalists do not think there is any reason to believe that psychopaths cannot tell the difference between right and wrong.
For more about how the internalist and externalist theses relate to the moral responsibility of psychopaths see Brink , 45—50; Duff ; Haksar ; and Milo See also Rosati It is beyond the purview of this entry to survey this literature.
The degree to which deviant behavior is caused by bad upbringings rather than genetic starting points or individual choices is a difficult empirical question.
Assuming that there is a strong causal connection between bad upbringings and deviant behaviour, there are two main arguments for the claim that we should not hold perpetrators morally responsible for behaviour that has resulted from bad upbringings.
The first argument contends that since we do not choose our upbringings we should not be held responsible for crimes which result from our upbringings See, e.
Susan Wolf offers a variant of this argument. According to Wolf people who have had particularly bad upbringings are unable to make accurate normative judgements because they have been taught the wrong values.
Wolf likens people who have been taught the wrong values to people suffering from psychosis because like psychotics they are unable to make accurate judgements about the world.
For example, Wolf has us consider the case of Jojo, the son of Jo, a ruthless dictator of a small South American country. Jo believes that there is nothing wrong with torturing or executing innocent people.
In fact, he enjoys expressing his unlimited power by ordering his guards to do just that. Jojo is given a special education which includes spending much of his day with his father.
Wolf argues that we should not hold Jojo responsible for torturing innocent people since his upbringing has made him unable to judge that these actions are wrong.
The second argument for the claim that we should not hold people morally responsible for crimes that result from bad upbringings begins with the supposition that we are morally responsible for our crimes only if we are appropriate objects of reactive attitudes, such as resentment Strawson According to this argument, perpetrators of crimes who have had particularly bad upbringings are not appropriate objects of reactive attitudes since there is no point to expressing these attitudes toward these perpetrators.
A proponent of this argument must then explain why there is no point to expressing reactive attitudes toward these perpetrators.
As a child, Harris was an affectionate good-hearted boy. Family members say that an abusive mother and harsh treatment at corrections facilities turned him into a malicious cold-blooded murderer.
Sometimes ignorance is used as an excuse for putative evildoing Jones , 69— The argument goes something like this: if an agent has no good reason to believe that she causes significant harm without moral justification, then she is not morally responsible for causing this harm because she has no good reason to act otherwise.
In this way ignorance can be a legitimate excuse for causing unjustified harm. However, since Aristotle, theorists have recognized that ignorance is only a legitimate excuse for causing unjustified harm when we are not responsible for our ignorance, i.
One sort of culpable ignorance which has received a fair bit of attention from philosophers writing about evil is ignorance that results from self-deception.
In self-deception we evade acknowledging to ourselves some truth or what we would see as the truth if our beliefs were based on an unbiased assessment of available evidence.
Some tactics used by self-deceivers to evade acknowledging some truth, including 1 avoiding thinking about the truth, 2 distracting themselves with rationalizations that are contrary to the truth, 3 systematically failing to make inquiries that would lead to evidence of the truth and 4 ignoring available evidence of the truth or distracting their attention from this evidence Jones , Several theorists writing about evil have suggested that self-deception plays a significant role in the production of evil actions and institutions Calder and ; Jones ; Thomas This entry will follow this convention.
For example, John Kekes holds an action-based regularity account Kekes , 48; , ; , 2 , while Todd Calder holds a motive-based dispositional account Calder , 22— According to regularity accounts, evil persons have evil-making properties habitually, or on a regular basis.
According to dispositional accounts, evil persons need never have evil-making properties. It is sufficient to have a disposition to have evil-making properties.
Action-based accounts contend that evil-making properties are certain sorts of actions—evil actions. Affect-based accounts contend that evil-making properties are certain sorts of feelings—evil feelings.
Motivation-based accounts contend that evil-making properties are certain sorts of motivations—evil desires. Some theorists argue for more than one sort of evil-making property.
For example, Luke Russell argues that both evil actions and evil feelings are evil making properties Russell , , while Daniel Haybron argues that evil feelings and evil motivations are evil-making properties Haybron b, Most theorists writing about evil personhood hold action-based accounts See, e.
According to action-based accounts, evil persons perform evil actions often enough, or are disposed to perform evil actions. Critics argue that the problem with action-based accounts is that it seems sufficient for evil personhood to have evil feelings or motivations, and thus, evil persons need not perform, or be disposed to perform, evil actions.
For instance, it seems that a harmless sadist who relishes in the suffering of others but who is not disposed to perform evil actions, could still be an evil person.
Similarly, a cowardly or incompetent sadist who strongly desires to cause others suffering but who is not disposed to perform evil actions, is still an evil person Calder , 23; Haybron b, According to affect-based accounts, evil people have certain sorts of feelings or emotions.
There is some initial plausibility to this view since sadism and malicious envy are paradigms of evil.
However, while it is undoubtedly true that some evil people are sadistic or maliciously envious, there is reason to believe that feelings of pleasure in pain or pain in pleasure, or any other sorts of feelings, are neither necessary nor sufficient for evil character.
The problem with thinking that certain sorts of feelings are necessary for evil character is that an evil person might routinely cause serious harm to her victims without any accompanying feelings.
For instance, someone who routinely runs down pedestrians out of indifference for their well-being, and without any accompanying feelings, seems to qualify as an evil person Calder , He should be pitied rather than condemned.
According to motivation-based accounts, to be an evil person is to be motivated in a certain sort of way. For instance, Todd Calder argues that to be an evil person it is sufficient to have a regular propensity for e-desires.
According to Calder, significant harm is desired for an unworthy goal if a state of affairs consisting of the achievement of the goal together with the harm would be less valuable than if the goal was not achieved and the harm was avoided Calder and See also Card, , 21 for a similar view.
A problem for motivation-based accounts is to explain why we should judge someone as evil based solely on her motivations. In other words, why judge someone as the morally worst sort of person for having certain desires if these desires do not result in significant harm?
Why not judge people as evil only if they actually cause significant harm? Haybron b, According to regularity accounts, evil persons have evil-making properties frequently, or on a regular basis See, e.
An advantage of regularity accounts is that they explain the intuition that evil persons deserve our strongest moral condemnation Russell , For if evil persons have evil-making properties frequently, or on a regular basis, then it makes sense to say that they are the worst sorts of people and deserve our strongest moral condemnation.
However, one problem with regularity accounts is that they do not seem to be able to make sense of the fact that some evil persons only very rarely if ever have evil-making properties.
For instance, Luke Russell argues that we should reject regularity accounts because they cannot accommodate the intuition that a brooding spree killer could be evil Russell , The brooding spree killer does not perform evil actions frequently or regularly.
She plans and fantasizes about her attack, and then performs evil actions sporadically or all at once.
Thus, Russell argues, if brooding spree killers can be evil, as we think they can be, then we should reject regularity accounts.
So the question becomes, are there persons who are comparable to brooding spree killers in that they have evil feelings or desires sporadically or infrequently rather than on a regular basis?
It seems that there might be cases of this sort when opportunities for evil feelings and desires are scarce. For example, we can imagine that an evil person might fail to have evil feelings and desires because she has been stranded on a deserted island.
After many years without potential victims and needing to focus all of her attention on survival, she might lack evil feelings and desires due to a poverty of stimulus.
This would mean that she is no longer an evil person on affect and motivation based regularity accounts. However, it seems that we should say that she is still an evil person if she is still disposed to have evil feelings and desires in the sense that her evil feelings and desires would immediately return if she were presented with a victim.
If so, we should reject affect and motivation based regularity accounts. Most theorists writing about evil personhood adopt dispositional accounts See, e.
Broadly speaking, dispositional accounts contend that someone is an evil person if, and only if, she is disposed to have evil-making properties.
A potential problem for dispositional accounts is that they seem to conflict with the intuition that evil persons are rare since most of us are disposed to have evil-making properties in certain sorts of situations Russell , For example, assuming for the moment that evil actions are evil-making properties, Stanley Milgram has shown that most of us are disposed to perform evil actions specifically, administering potentially lethal electric shocks to innocent people when in certain experimental conditions i.
But if most of us are disposed to perform evil actions in these situations then it seems that on the dispositional account of evil personhood, most of us are evil, and thus, evil is not rare.
To make sense of the rarity of evil personhood, Luke Russell proposes a restricted dispositional account according to which someone is an evil person if, and only if, she is strongly disposed to perform evil actions in only autonomy-favoring conditions Russell , 72— Peter Barry argues for a similar view [See Barry , 82—90].
According to Russell, although most of us are strongly disposed to perform evil actions in Milgram scenarious, since Milgram scenarios are not autonomy-favoring conditions, most of us are not evil persons.
But if we do not have a disposition to perform evil actions on an on-going basis, then we do not really have a strong disposition to perform evil actions, or at least, one could argue, not in the sense implicitly meant by the basic dispositional account.
But we might reject this reasoning and argue instead that most of us are susceptible to becoming evil persons in these environments, and so, need to be wary of these environments.
In addition to arguing for regularity or dispositional accounts on the one hand, and action-based, affect-based, or motivation-based accounts on the other, theorists have argued for several additional theses concerning evil personhood.
According to the fixity thesis, evil persons have particularly fixed, or durable, characters such that it is very difficult to go from evil to non-evil, and changes of this sort rarely occur.
See also, Barry , 82— Todd Calder has argued against the fixity thesis. Imagine that Darlene has a highly fixed disposition to perform evil actions that she does little to resist.
Geoff also has a disposition to perform evil actions, but this disposition is not highly fixed because he is indifferent about whether he should be disposed to perform evil actions and is, in general, capricious and unprincipled.
If so, the characters of evil persons need not be highly fixed Calder b, According to the consistency thesis, evil persons have evil-making properties, or are disposed to have evil-making properties, consistently, or almost all of the time.
By this he means that evil people almost always lack empathy and concern for others, and they are in no way motivated to help others or to do what is morally right.
Some theorists contrast the consistency thesis with the extremity thesis according to which evil persons have some set of character traits to an extreme degree, e.
The extremity thesis is consistent with most theories of evil personhood. The consistency thesis is more controversial.
Critics of the consistency thesis argue that it is too restrictive Calder , 22—27; Russell , Imagine that Bob loves to torture children and does so frequently, but that Bob also displays genuine compassion for the elderly, perhaps by volunteering at a long-term care facility on a regular basis.
According to the consistency thesis, Bob is not an evil person because he does not have evil-making characteristics consistently.
And yet most people would want to say that torturing children for fun on a regular basis is enough to make Bob an evil person Calder , 22— According to the mirror thesis an evil person is the mirror-image of a moral saint.
Several theorists who write about evil personhood endorse this thesis and use it to argue for their theories Barry ; ; Haybron b.
This argument makes an implicit appeal to the mirror thesis. Luke Russell rejects the mirror thesis, arguing that while moral saints are morally admirable in all respects, some paradigmatic evil persons possess some morally admirable traits, such as courage, commitment, and loyalty, which help them achieve their immoral goals Russell , — Since evil persons need not be bad in every respect and moral saints must be good in every respect, we should reject the mirror thesis.
In response, Peter Brian Barry argues that on plausible conceptions of moral sainthood, i. While most theorists writing about evil focus on evil action and evil character, there has also been some discussion of evil institutions.
For a recent contribution to this literature which makes explicit reference to evil collectives, see Scarre According to Claudia Card, an institution, in sense 2 , i.
For instance, genocide is an evil institution since significant suffering and a loss of social vitality result from its normal and correct operation without moral justification Card , — Her classification of marriage and motherhood as evil has been particularly controversial.
According to Card, marriage and motherhood are evil institutions because it is reasonably foreseeable that their normal, or correct, operation will lead to intolerable harm in the form of domestic abuse without justification or excuse Card , — Card argues that there is no moral justification for the intolerable harm that results from the institution of marriage since nothing prevents us from abolishing marriage in favour of other less dangerous institutions.
Critics argue that even if Card is correct that it is reasonably foreseeable that the institution of marriage will lead to intolerable harms, it is too heavy-handed to call marriage an evil institution.
For instance, Todd Calder has argued that an institution should be considered evil only if intolerable harm is an essential component of the institution.
Since suffering and a loss of social vitality are essential components of genocide, genocide is an evil institution. But since spousal abuse is not an essential component of marriage, marriage is not an evil institution Calder , 27— Augustine, Saint evil: problem of Kant, Immanuel: moral philosophy Kant, Immanuel: philosophy of religion moral motivation moral responsibility moral skepticism Nietzsche, Friedrich: moral and political philosophy Plato: middle period metaphysics and epistemology Plotinus reasons for action: internal vs.
Calder SMU. This entry gives an overview of answers to these questions found in the literature. Evil-Skepticism Versus Evil-Revivalism 1. The History of Theories of Evil 2.
Contemporary Theories of Evil Action 3. Haybron b, 4. Evil Institutions While most theorists writing about evil focus on evil action and evil character, there has also been some discussion of evil institutions.
Bibliography Aharoni, E. Kiehl, and W. Allison, H. Anglin, B. Arendt, H. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics , M.
Ostwald trans. Augustine, Confessions , H. Chadwick trans. Stothert trans. Dods ed. Bar On, B. Barry, P. Bernstein, R. Brink, D.
Burt, D. Calder, T. Haybron ed. Veltman and K. Norlock eds. Card, C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clendinnen, I. Cole, P.
Coyel, J. De Wijze, S. Driver, J. Duff, A. Eagleton, T. Feinberg, J. Formosa, P. Garcia, E. Garrard, E.
Goldberg, Z. Haksar, V.This section does not cite any sources. Whoever murders will answer for it in court. If then the light within you is darkness, how great is that darkness! Dark will only swallow dark and deepen. The economic value of labour may be assessed technically in terms of its use-value or utility or commercially in terms Spiele Heart 2 Heart - Video Slots Online its exchange-valueprice or production cost see also labour power. Anglin, B.
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